Séminaires Roy
Informations pratiques
- Année 2009-2010
- Lieu : Bât. E - RDC - Salle E101 - Ecole normale supérieure,
48 boulevard Jourdan, Paris 14e (sauf mention contraire)
- Métro : Porte d'Orléans
- Plan d'accès
- Jour & horaires : lundi - 17h00-18h30 (sauf mention contraire)
- Organisateurs (s) : Milo Bianchi (PSE), Francis Bloch (Polytechnique)
et Laurent Lamy (PSE)
Prochains séminaires
- 15 février 2010
- Larry Samuelson (Yale University)
- 8 mars 2010
- 15 mars 2010
- Estelle Cantillon (Ecares)
- 22 mars 2010
- Claudio Mezzetti (Warwick)
- 29 mars 2010
- 12 avril 2010
- 3 mai 2010
- 10 mai 2010
- Ehud Kalai (Northwestern)
- 17 mai 2010
- Dirk Bergmann (Yale University)
- 24 mai 2010
- 7 juin 2010
- 14 juin 2010
- Debraj Ray (New-York University)
Précédents
séminaires
- 28 septembre 2009
- Tore Ellingsen (Stockholm School of Economics)
Bilateral Bargaining with Durable Commitments
- 5 octobre 2009
- 12 octobre 2009
- Mihai Manea (MIT)
Bargaining in Stationary Networks
- 19 octobre 2009
- Alvin Roth (Harvard University)
Kidney Exchange: recent developments and open questions
- 26 octobre 2009
- In-Uck Park (Bristol) avec Bruno Jullien
Seller Reputation
and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication
It is shown that if there is adverse
selection on seller's ability in experience goods market,
credible communication can be sustained by reputation
motives in spite of the inherent conflict of interests
between sellers and buyers. In the absence of "commitment" types,
reputation motives are explained as a consequence of
equilibrium interplay between the market's perception
on a seller's ability to deliver quality and the level
of trust it places on the information he provides. Moreover,
reputation motives do not disappear even after the seller's
ability is revealed. This model is applied to examine
the extent to which consumer rating systems may discipline
sellers in honestly informing buyers about the quality
of their product. Also analyzed is the im- pact of the
possibility that sellers may restart as new traders by
obtaining new identities.
JEL Codes: C73, D82, D83, L14
Keywords: cheap talk, consumer rating system, reputation,
trust.
- 16 novembre 2009
- Vasiliki Skreta (NYU, Stern)
What to put on the table
- 23 novembre 2009
- 30 novembre 2009
- Sébastien Pouget (Toulouse School of Economics)
Rational and Irrational Bubbles: An Experiment
- 7 décembre 2009
- 14 décembre 2009